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The Tragedy of Roland Barthes 
John McKeane 
 
 
n the work of Roland Barthes, tragedy is subject to a series of striking 
reversals. Whilst On Racine is well known for denouncing the deathly 
effects of canonization, earlier texts on tragedy defend it as the birth of 
Western reason. And whilst his 1963 text is not without a hubristic 
rebelliousness recalling the events of Œdipus Rex, in Barthes’s later work 
tragedy, having been rejected, returns with a vengeance symbolized by 
the now-destitute Œdipus at Colonus. Tragedy shifts strikingly from a 
theatrical practice – as a student, Barthes belonged to an Ancient 
Theatre Group for which he played Darius in Aeschylus’s Persians – to an 
object of literary and theoretical reflection, before bursting through in its 
most destructive form, that of lived experience. As I hope to show, all of 
this means that various important aspects of his thinking demand to be 
known as the tragedy of Roland Barthes.  
 His role as Darius is itself narrativized when he includes a photo 
of the production in Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. Not included in 
the work, however, was a statement originally rejected for publication 
but nonetheless noteworthy on the subject of tragedy. In it, he states 
that 
 
Long ago, in bourgeois circles, the claims of homosexuality 
could not be made in contestatory, leftist fashion […]. 
Homosexual discourse could only exist through a 
sublimated, formalized mediation: that of ancient Greece 
with its value as high culture, which happily itself was 
passably queer.1 
 
The formal, aestheticized, distanced quality of Greek tragedy when 
conventionally staged, so often criticized for elitism, is thus presented as 
providing a refuge for a gay discourse still seeking to find a directly 
political voice.2 Beyond this, Tiphaine Samoyault’s recent biography 
cites a letter of 1950 in which Barthes writes: ‘I am not far away from 
comprehending a certain tragic materialism – which in my maturity will 
perhaps be the position bringing together my two youths’.3 Doubtless 
‘materialism’ here refers to his left-wing activities as a lycéen, and perhaps 
to the sceptical mind that would pinpoint the mythologies operative in 
I 
 
John McKeane 
 
 
62 
bourgeois culture. But his other youth is presented as being under the 
sign of tragedy.  
 Indeed, it is striking that of Barthes’s dozen or more articles and 
reviews directly addressing tragedy, none post-dates the mid-1960s: it is 
as if tragedy were his youth. And as is well known, the theme did not 
withdraw quietly, but amidst the sound and the fury of the dispute with 
Raymond Picard. This dispute is often presented as heralding a shift in 
generation, the arrival of la nouvelle critique, and as such we can ask 
whether it can be considered – in terms of course provided by tragedy – 
as an Œdipal scene. I shall return to this conflagration of Barthes’s 
thematizing interest in tragedy, before moving on to tragedy’s different 
modes of presence in his late writing. But in order to get there, let us 
look first at two earlier texts.4  
  
* 
 
In 1941, Barthes submitted a dissertation for the Master’s-level diplôme 
d’études supérieures entitled ‘Evocations and Incantations in Greek 
Tragedy’.5 At this stage, Greek tragedy (specifically that of Æschylus, 
rather than Sophocles or Euripides) was therefore not merely one 
interest amongst many, but the central concern of Barthes’s academic 
interest.  
The dissertation grew out of a desire to study the mechanisms of 
catharsis in tragedy, especially those reliant on music, even though no 
Greek music has survived in written form. Perhaps due to this difficulty, 
the dissertation’s actual focus is on evocations (of the dead) and 
incantations (of the gods), two notions that Barthes sees as inextricable 
from one another. Such perspectives – where tragedy is seen as a genre 
oriented towards forms of otherness such as music, the dead, and the 
gods – suggest that Barthes was drawing on challenging, modern thinking 
of the genre. And indeed, Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy features in both 
the bibliography and the argument.6 This dissertation causes us to ask: 
what is the relative importance of this modern, philosophical approach 
to tragedy on the one hand, and of a traditional literary approach on the 
other? For alongside Nietzsche there is much analysis of metre and 
rhythm, seen by some as reified forms, the study of which distracts us 
from the ritual aspects of tragedy. In pausing briefly over this 
dissertation, we can explore this tension as well as its significance for 
narratives of Barthes’s thought: in 1941, was tragedy already allowing 
him to deconstruct the literary canon, or should his attention to it be 
classed as mere juvenilia? 
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For Nietzsche, tragedy is a composite form featuring both what 
he names the Apollonian (form, representation: emblematized by 
statues) and the Dionysian (force, shapelessness: emblematized by 
music). The cohabitation of the two is by no means abstract, but based 
in Athenian stage practice: the Dionysian being represented by the 
singing and dancing chorus, and the Apollonian by the individual, named 
protagonists and antagonists. Indeed, for Nietzsche and others the 
interaction of the two elements changes over the history of tragedy, 
which at its birth was wholly Dionysian, a religious ritual, before 
developing into a composite form when the first actor, the first thespian 
– Thespis – stepped forth from the chorus to speak individual lines. 
Barthes adopts this view of tragedy as a composite, Apollonian-
Dionysian form, a view that establishes premises for his later attacks on 
uses of Phaedra in bourgeois theatre as entirely focused on the 
aristocratic individual (representing the Apollonian) and without 
concern for ritual or collective structure (the Dionysian). Indeed, he sees 
the radically disruptive force both in the chorus, and in the evocations 
and incantations on which his dissertation focuses. He writes:   
 
Æschylus’s incantations are, above all, movement; in them, 
feelings reach a violence that is all the greater because they 
have to be materially efficient. These stasima are not 
assuaging; in them, the chorus is not limited to the role of 
a philosophizing pacifier. In them, everything contributes 
to passionate or dramatic reactions. These incantations set 
the tragedy in motion, and magnify it. They are summits, 
points of election, where the horizon changes utterly, where 
the drama changes course and widens.7 
 
Here Barthes rejects literary or reified forms of tragedy where the chorus 
has shrunk to a mere narrator function: its role is not to provide a 
detached, pacifying, ‘philosophizing’ commentary, but to represent the 
massed audience on stage, thus erasing the boundary between audience 
and stage, confirming tragic theatre as a religious ritual. The language of 
‘summits, points of election’ is clear in the importance it gives to the 
chorus and incantations.  
 In his dissertation as a whole, however, Barthes does not go so 
far as to argue that these moments of passion prevent tragedy from being 
the crucible of Western reason, democracy, and civilization. He is 
willing to accept that it is a genre that makes space for the Dionysian, 
but he nonetheless places significant emphasis on the Apollonian too: 
this is a composite genre.8 He proposes an understanding of tragedy that 
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is less radical – but also less destructive, more sustainable – than those of 
Hölderlin before or the Living Theatre after him. This is to say that the 
polemical, deconstructive force of his later writings is not yet present in 
this Master’s dissertation: instead his emphasis on the various ironies and 
paradoxes of tragedy as a composite genre fits snugly within the French 
academic esprit de synthèse (the ability to demonstrate the underlying 
unity of apparently disparate phenomena, still explicitly valued today). 
For instance, we can read that:  
 
For [the Greeks] the moments of deep emotion, of total 
lyricism, of the greatest musical inebriation, coincide to the 
point of confusion with moments of intense deductive will, 
of the greatest logical rigour of thought. For us, who have 
grown used to accompanying the noun reason with the 
adjective cool, there is nothing stranger. But this is the 
Greek miracle: at the deepest point of Dionysian 
inebriation there is Apollonian lucidity. This chapter 
would like its lesson to be that there is no possibility of 
conflict here, but instead the reign of perfect coincidence 
and a sameness [identité] in nature.9 
 
Whereas for the modern subject reason is cool and calculating, reading 
the Greek tragics allows us to speak not of cool reason, but of hot 
reason. Having made a place in his system for otherness in the form of 
incantation and evocation, Barthes is able to proceed to show how his 
thesis is not radical, does not – as it were – frighten the horses as regards 
the values of his time and his context: deduction, logical rigour, lucidity. 
Later, we read that ‘incantation is logical’ and that the relation between 
Apollo and Dionysus is a ‘dialectic’.10  Where in the passage above 
Barthes cites this lack of conflict, lack of polemic between the two 
elements as ‘the Greek miracle’, in closing his dissertation he write as 
follows: ‘Here is a process that is unique in the history of the human 
mind [esprit], a rare and solitary moment, a perfect miracle in which the 
romantic and cartesian peoples can be recognized with equal 
justification’.11  Of course, it is somewhat unfair to critique what was a 
Master’s dissertation and remains an unpublished archival document. 
Whilst showing a clear engagement with the radically disruptive 
influence of Dionysus through the thought of Nietzsche, Barthes’s 
dissertation remains a document which aimed to prove its institutional, 
academic value. We can perhaps say that this young Barthes was already 
a tragic, but precisely one of the line of tragic characters who insist on 
the viability of synthesis, comprehension, analysis; forebodingly so.  
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* 
 
The second early Barthes text on tragedy I wish to look at is from 1955, 
when alongside two reviews of productions of Œdipus Rex published that 
year, he reviewed the Oresteia directed by Jean-Louis Barrault. The title 
of his article asked the key question: ‘How can what is ancient be 
represented[?]’12  Was one to emphasize the primal, archaic, Dionysian 
elements of Greek tragedy, or was one instead to underline mankind’s 
heroic, Apollonian struggle against such obscure forces? 
 For Barthes, Barrault’s production attempted to both, and 
ultimately did neither. It had the merit of seeking to be Dionysian, but 
did not have the confidence in itself necessary to completely reject 
Apollo. In terms that are clearly problematic today, and show that in this 
instance Barthes drew upon a colonial imaginary we might have expected 
him to deconstruct, he defined the production’s Dionysian elements as 
the exoticism of a ‘negro festival’. Thus he wrote that  
 
[The] only justification [for exoticism] would have been 
that it physically transformed the spectators, making them 
uncomfortable, fascinating them, placing them under its 
spell. But here there is nothing like that: we remain cold, at 
an ironic distance, unable to believe in partial panic, 
having already been inoculated by the efforts of the 
‘psychological’ actors. It was necessary to choose: either the 
negro festival [fête nègre], or Marie Bell. In trying to play 
on both levels (Marie Bell for humanist criticism and the 
negro festival for the avant-garde), it was inevitable that 
they would lose out across the board.13   
 
By failing to choose between the ancient and modern elements of Greek 
tragedy, the production was therefore doomed to fail. It is interesting 
that Barthes reads these elements in terms of their place within 
twentieth-century debates in theatrical practice: critics interested in the 
psychology of the individual are said to be ‘humanist’, whilst those 
interested in the disruptive force of the ‘negro festival’ represent the 
avant-garde. Clearly there is a prefiguring here of the attacks in On 
Racine on those who see Phaedra in terms of the inner psychology of the 
bourgeois individual.  
 Barthes’s thesis The Fashion System is also prefigured in this 
review’s attention to the semiology of the costumes worn during the 
production. He writes as follows:  
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In temporal terms, The Oresteia contains three levels: the 
supposed era of myth, Æschylus’s era, and the era of the 
spectator. One of these three levels of reference should have 
been chosen and stuck to, for […] our only possible way of 
relating to Greek tragedy is to be aware of its historical 
situation. […] Agamemnon and Clytemnestra are dressed 
in barbarian fashion, committing the tragedy to an archaic, 
Minoan meaning, an approach that would be totally 
legitimate if adopted across the board. But then we see 
Orestes, Electra, and Apollo who quickly gainsay this 
choice: they are fifth-century Greeks, and counter the 
monstrously gigantic proportions of the primitive clothes 
with the grace, harmony, simple and sober humanity of 
the silhouettes of classical Greece.14  
 
This analysis of fashion and stage design does not exclude humour: 
Barthes at one point mentions ‘a carpet that has come directly from 
Hermès (the boutique, not the god)’.15  But what is more important is 
the underlying historical schema: a distinction is drawn between the 
period when the mythic events are supposed to have taken place, the 
fifth century BC when Æschylus wrote the drama, and the contemporary 
moment. More than this, values are ascribed to these different periods: 
the mythical time is said to be ‘barbarian’, whereas the  fifth century 
denotes ‘the grace, harmony, simple and sober humanity of the 
silhouettes of classical Greece’. 
 What is being outlined here is nothing other than a narrative of 
progress, the received story of the birth of Western democracy and 
reason in fifth-century Athens. For all the foreshadowing of Barthes’s 
later, deconstructive work on Racine and on fashion, such statements 
align strikingly well with the secular humanism of the French educational 
and intellectual establishment, albeit progressive and left-leaning. This 
becomes more clear as we read further in the article: 
   
When placed back in its era […], The Oresteia was 
undeniably a progressivist work; it bore witness to the 
move from a matriarchal society, represented by the 
Erinyes, to a patriarchal society, represented by Apollo and 
Athena. […] The Oresteia is a profoundly politicized work 
[…] [it] tells us what the men of that time were trying to 
overcome, the obscurantism that little by little they were 
attempting to enlighten; but it also tells us that these efforts 
are anachronistic for us, that that they new gods that they 
attempted to enthrone are gods that we in our turn have 
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overcome. There is a march of history, a difficult but 
undeniable removing of the barriers of barbarism, a 
progressive assuredness that mankind has within itself the 
remedy to its evils; we must endlessly make ourselves aware 
of all of these, because seeing the distance we have travelled 
allows us to take courage and hope for all that still remains 
to be done.16  
 
The extremely general ‘we’ – presumably representing the Western 
subject – that is spoken of is said to have progressed beyond the 
matriarchal laws of archaic Greece, and also beyond the patriarchy that 
replaced them in the Athenian polis. But the underlying movement of 
progress is doubtless the same: the ‘march of history’ has merely 
advanced to a new stage, and from this we are able to take ‘courage’ and 
‘hope’. In short, Barthes’s 1955 article adopts wholesale a raft of the 
received ideas of the French (and Western) educational and intellectual 
establishment. If confirmation of this were needed, we can find the 
opposition evoked above between ancient and modern in the language of 
‘obscurantism’ and ‘enlighten[ment]’; shortly afterward, he even goes so 
far as to speak of ‘the only relationship that today we are able to have 
with ancient tragedy, which is one of clarity’.17  The clarity of thought, 
enlightenment through progress: such is the project that the tortuous 
writing of Derrida would seek to undermine less than ten years later. 
Indeed, ‘clarity’ is one of the sacred cows of French literary criticism that 
Barthes attacks in Criticism and Truth of 1966.18  But a decade earlier, it 
was a central tenet of his approach.  
* 
How did one state of affairs become the other? The circumstances of and 
polemic surrounding Barthes’s On Racine (1963), a slim volume 
containing reprintings of three essays (first published in 1958-1960), 
have been covered by critics on multiple occasions.19  There is doubtless 
much work to be done on the influence on Barthes of works such as 
Lucien Goldmann’s The Hidden God: a Study of Tragic Vision in the 
‘Pensées’ of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine (1955) and Charles 
Mauron’s The Unconscious in the Work and Life of Racine (1957), as well 
as on the role of Brecht in revolutionizing his views of the theatre.20  
Such would be the way to properly assess the material presented by the 
slim volume On Racine; this study will pass over this material, perhaps in 
the manner of a tragedy which allows the events it speaks of to take 
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place off-stage, instead concentrating on how they are narrativized by 
and for the protagonists concerned, in our case: Roland Barthes. 
We have already seen Barthes’s statement that, alongside 
materialism, tragedy was his other youth, and indeed considered that we 
can at some level read tragedy as: youth. But is it possible to go further 
and to view the rejection in On Racine of many aspects of tragedy as an 
Œdipal crisis in which youth, childhood, or infancy are abandoned? The 
dispute following On Racine certainly seems to rely on Œdipal energies 
in the prominent place it takes in narratives of the period; see for 
instance Louis Althusser: ‘At last someone saying that Racine’s famous 
“psychology”, that the famous, so violent, so pure and so savage, 
Racinian passions… don’t exist! Someone saying that it is really just 
literature….’.21  There is doubtless a pleasure – a cathartic pleasure – in 
throwing off the weight of tradition in this way, in slaughtering the 
sacred cow. But whilst enjoying our pleasures, enjoying our symptoms – 
in the words of Althusser’s colleague and rival at the École normale 
supérieure, Jacques Lacan – we must also be wary of them. 
 To see an Œdipal crisis as the crisis in or after which tragedy is 
abandoned would of course be ironic insofar as Œdipus is a tragic figure. 
But there is irony in his fate: not only does he kill his father, but he 
becomes King in his place, in that sense becoming his own father. The 
model of rejecting tragedy on one level, the better to find it once more 
on another, is certainly present in Barthes’s thinking. For instance, the 
same critique of theatrical practice levelled at Phaedra was also made 
regarding Œdipus Rex:  ‘however it is staged, Sophocles’s Œdipus proves 
boring to us’. And yet, he continued, ‘[t]he myth is alive: named by 
Freud, henceforth read avidly into a thousand novels, films, new stories 
and fragments of real situations, once more it is astonishing us, 
fascinating us, enveloping us in a sort of obscure terror’.22  In other 
words, we lose the theatrical Œdipus, reified in the form of mere 
literature, but we gain the myth or the theory of Œdipus, imbued with a 
new vitality and applicable in a thousand situations.23  
What’s more, Barthes’s writing on Racine – drawing on 
Mauron’s psychocritical analysis of the playwright and his work – 
suggests that such an Œdipal model might well be applicable to the 
dispute over tragedy in the mid-1960s. For the figure of the Father is a 
crucial part of the analyses of Racine by Barthes. He directly adopts 
Mauron’s structuralist method of superimposing the various plays on one 
another in order to locate the underlying, essential myth or drama (a 
term meaning ‘action’).24  And this method tells us that a correspondingly 
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essential Father-figure determines much of Racine’s drama. Barthes 
writes:  
 
It is not necessarily either blood-relations or gender that 
make up [the Father], nor even power; his being is his 
anteriority: what comes after him has issued from him, and 
is inevitably engaged in a problematic of fidelity. The 
Father is the past. And because what defines him lies far 
beyond his attributes (blood relations, authority, age, sex), 
he is truly, and forever, a total Father; beyond nature, he is 
a primordial, irreversible fact: that which has been is, such 
is the status of time in Racine.25  
 
The fact that this is a Father rather than a father, which is to say that it 
is a transferable, mobile symbol, is crucial here. For it tells us that this 
Father represents ‘anteriority’ in general: not merely a given father as – 
by definition – older than his son or daughter, but the entirety of the 
past. And we might add that if the father is rejected in the Œdipus 
scenario as it is described by psychoanalysis, it is not due to anything 
that any particular father has or has not done, but simply due to the 
structural position of the Father-figure. Anyone acting out an Œdipal 
scenario is bound to reject whatever authority, whatever representative 
of the past, stood over their youth.  
  In classical psychoanalytic theory, the Œdipus crisis passes from 
being an aspect of the theory of infant development to one of the major 
structures informing the culture and society of adults. It is said to follow 
earlier developmental stages in which a relation to an object external to 
itself is formed (the oral stage, the anal stage, and so on).26  Whilst it 
becomes a general structure governing human relations, no longer strictly 
applicable to one’s own parents, this does not make its influence on 
adult actions any less real. What are we to make of this scenario in 
relation to Barthes? Is it possible to say that On Racine and the reaction 
to it constitute an Œdipal crisis? Certainly, the parallel is an attractive 
one, especially given that Barthes emerged from the polemic as the 
figurehead of la nouvelle critique, the newly crowned King: Œdipus Rex. 
But if we return momentarily to psychoanalytic theory, we notice that 
even the stages mentioned above, let alone the Œdipus stage which 
follows them, rest upon the axiom of the infant developing a series of 
relative, distanced relations to its mother. And in short, although it is 
not my intention to psychoanalyze Barthes as an individual through the 
strict application of Freudian theory, it seems clear that it is a difficult 
task to base any reading upon a sense of distance between this thinker 
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and his mother.27  One could mention his Mourning Diary published 
following her death, the photograph of her that he pointedly does not 
include in Camera Lucida, or more anecdotally, her presence in the front 
row as he gave his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France.28  Therefore 
it seems that the idea of On Racine as an Œdipal crisis could only be 
accepted on condition that it be a crisis that never truly began (and 
perhaps for that reason, never truly ended either). Such, perhaps, is what 
sets up in his later life and his later works – to which we now turn – 
another tragedy of Roland Barthes.  
 
* 
 
Properly speaking, Barthes’s later writings do not have a relation to 
tragedy, in the sense that all relations imply a distance: they do not have 
a relation to tragedy, in that tragedy is never extensively thematized or 
discussed. But it does feature, fragmentarily, and in ways that – I argue – 
suggest that the later Barthes can have no relation to tragedy quite simply 
because he is tragic.  
 First of all, there is Œdipus. His viability as a model or parallel 
has been considered, with On Racine setting off something akin to an 
Œdipal crisis in French thought (if not precisely in Barthes’s own 
development). Where Œdipus’s solving of the riddle led to him 
becoming a philosopher-king, Barthes’s text led to attempts to crown 
him as a theorist-king. But uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 
especially if it never wanted to do so, and Barthes’s refusal to take part in 
May ’68 showed his disquiet with any role as leader of a new radical 
generation. Œdipus’s fate after the tragic realization of what he has done 
is of course the subject of a further drama by Sophocles, Œdipus at 
Colonus. And it is noteworthy that this mad, wandering, destitute 
Œdipus is referred to on several occasions in the fragments on Morocco 
contained in Barthes’s Incidents. First we read that: ‘Two elderly 
American women take hold of a tall, old blind man and force him to 
walk across the street. But what this Œdipus would have preferred was 
money: money, money, not assistance.’29  And shortly afterwards: ‘An old 
blind man with a white beard, wearing a djeballa, is begging: he is stately, 
impassive, ancient, Sophoclean, classically tragic [odéonesque]’.30  In both 
cases, encountering a Moroccan who is old, blind, and poor brings 
Œdipus to Barthes’s mind: not the young Œdipus whose narrative is one 
of sex, violence, and power, but the one who suffers the consequences of 
his earlier hubris. His eyes have been blinded in a symbolic self-exclusion 
from the all-seeing comprehension he boasted of – and similarly, 
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Incidents is from the period when Barthes moved away from structuralist 
theory (θεωρία meaning in Greek: vision). And he wanders in a foreign 
land, Colonus rather than Thebes, just as Barthes finds himself not in 
France but in Morocco.   
 These would remain isolated incidents – precisely – were it not 
for the defining episode of Barthes’s final years, the death of his mother, 
and the resultant Mourning Diary. To see this, we must recall the notion 
that tragedy is a total state: in the sense that any tragic figure is wholly, 
existentially, absolutely affected by whatever tragedy has befallen them. 
Tragedy is irrecuperable, withdrawn from time and history; in other 
words, any tragedy from which one recovers is not a tragedy (this 
thinking is present in Goldmann’s work, on which Barthes drew in On 
Racine).31  Such a model of tragedy is crucial to Barthes in his Mourning 
Diary, insofar as this totalizing model excludes any relation to tragedy: 
one cannot calmly relate to tragedy – or put differently, anything to 
which one can calmly relate is not tragedy. Tragedy is a drama or action 
rather than a play, staging, or representation: it is anterior to any such 
representation and destructive of it. Accordingly, we see Barthes 
explicitly rejecting any theatre of his emotions. In the Mourning Diary, 
he writes: ‘Despair : the word is too theatrical, a part of language’ and 
that ‘the notion of “theatralizing” my mother’s death would have been 
intolerable for me’.32  Thus just as above we saw him rejecting theatrical 
practice and insisting that Œdipus lived on only in psychoanalytical 
theory, now we see him again rejecting the notion of theatre, with the 
implication that no form can contain the burning pain of tragedy 
experienced.   
 What is true for theatrical form (even understood virtually) is 
also true of dialectical schemas. Thus whilst for the Master’s dissertation 
of 1941 tragedy was a site of dialectical ‘miracle’ allowing for the 
synthesis of suffering and its comprehension, for the Mourning Diary 
death ‘is no longer an event, it is another duration, compressed, 
insignificant, not narrated, grim, without recourse: a true mourning not 
susceptible to any narrative dialectic’.33  The total or absolute situation 
in which this death has placed him is described as ‘[t]he high seas of 
suffering – the shores left behind, nothing in sight’ or even more simply – 
in almost absolute simplicity, with no verb, no syntax, and the noun that 
is present is that of inorganic stasis – with the words ‘a stone’.34  Such is 
one possibility of fragmentary writing – separation, stasis, stagnation.  
 At moments in the Journal there are attempts to pull in the 
opposite direction. Indeed, on three occasions Barthes himself 
dramatizes the debate between the easy heterogeneity of his previous 
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1970s texts – we recall the critical attack on him entitled Le Roland-
Barthes sans peine35 – and the absoluteness of the tragic situation:   
  
A stupefying, though not distressing notion – that she has 
not been ‘everything’ for me. If she had, I wouldn’t have 
written my work. Since I’ve been taking care of her, the last 
six months in fact, she was ‘everything’ for me, and I’ve 
completely forgotten that I had ever written. I was no 
longer anything but desperately hers. Before, she had made 
herself transparent so that I could write.36  
 
On the one hand, she wants everything, total mourning, 
its absolute (but then it is not her, it is I who invest her 
with the demand for such a thing). And on the other 
(being then truly herself), she offers me lightness, life, as if 
she were still saying: ‘go on, go out, have a good time…’.37   
 
I waver – in the dark – between the observation (but is it 
entirely accurate?) that I’m unhappy only by moments, by 
jerks and surges, sporadically, even if such spasms are close 
together – and the conviction that deep down, in actual fact, 
I am continually, all the time unhappy since maman’s 
death.38  
 
It seems clear that in these passages the same question is returning to 
trouble Barthes: is there a possibility of lightness, freedom, movement, or 
has his mother’s death sucked all the air from his activities? Is the only 
thing to be said: ‘a stone’? It is tempting to use what we know of 
Barthes’s final two years (his inability to write, his refusal to fight for life 
following his road-traffic accident) to conclude that he was indeed now 
‘deep down, in actual fact […], continually […] unhappy’.  
 But instead of doing so, let us instead use his strictly 
autobiographical – or autothanatographical – remarks to think further 
about this issue. When in the Mourning Diary the topic is not his 
relation to his mother, but simply himself, there seems very little doubt 
that the argument for the absoluteness of his situation wins out. He 
writes: ‘Today, around 5:00 in the afternoon, everything is just about 
settled: a definitive solitude, having no other conclusion but my own 
death.’39  Elsewhere we read that  
 
To think, to know that maman is dead forever, completely 
(‘completely’, which is inconceivable without violence, nor 
can one abide by such a thought for very long), is to think, 
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letter by letter (literally, and simultaneously), that I too 
will die forever and completely. 
 There is then, in mourning (in this kind of 
mourning, which is mine), a radical and new 
domestication of death; for previously, it was only a 
borrowed knowledge (clumsy, had from others, from 
philosophy, etc.), but now it is my knowledge. It can 
hardly do me any more harm than my mourning.40  
 
In an effect of repetition between his mother’s and his own situations, he 
adopts the characteristics of being dead ‘forever and completely’ (terms he 
underlines). Similarly, his knowledge of death is at last fully his own 
knowledge, a knowledge that no one else can know to the same extent, 
or in his place.41  He can be said to be a tragic figure insofar as he is 
definitively fixed by the relation to his death: like Lewis Payne on death 
row in the photograph discussed in Camera Lucida, we can say of him: 
‘He is dead and he is going to die’.42  
 Such of course is also the situation of Phaedra, whose first words 
are famously ‘let’s go no further, but stop here’: Racine’s play is co-
extensive not with her death – which has in a sense already been decided 
on – but with its cruel and unusual consequences for those around her.43  
By the time the play begins, her tragedy has already been decided on, 
with the gods instilling in her a desire that she knows cannot be realized, 
that she knows signals that she can no longer live in the world. Her 
tragic drama is forever prior, withdrawn, ab-stract and ab-solute with 
regard to any subsequent effects on her relations to those around her, or 
the staged representations of those effects.44  And a similar sense of 
absolute or ab-solute tragedy can be seen in Goldmann’s work on 
Racine, when he states that: ‘[a] Jansenist who was consistent in his 
views would not have written tragedies, and a man who was wholly at 
home and integrated in the world would not have written tragedies.’45  
This raises the possibility of there existing within the Jansenist 
movement to which Racine belonged something like an unwritten, 
absolute tragedy, something utterly irrecuperable that burns and 
corrodes any container in which it is placed.  
 Racine’s long silence after Phaedra  has famously haunted literary 
criticism. After his tragic youth, after the quasi-Œdipal scene of the 
polemic around la nouvelle critique, and most of all after the death of his 
mother, it seems that there was a new silence, a new inability to write, a 
new tragic drama that precluded all possibility, even that of life itself: 
that of Roland Barthes.  
 
John McKeane 
 
 
74 
Notes 
                                                
1 Roland Barthes, Le Lexique de l’auteur: Séminaire à l’École pratique des hautes 
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